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This paper focuses on the way that households respond to ‘global pressures’ by adapting their 
social reproduction strategies (SRS). We understand SRS to encapsulate the more or less 
consciously developed day-to-day and inter-generational responses to the social conditions that 
households confront and their own motivations and aspirations for the future. Yet, due to a 
range of extant inequalities of accumulated and dynamic resources – some of which are 
material and some of which are at once ethereal and embodied in the concrete labouring 
capacities of individuals – we argue that SRS and capacities to pursue them differ widely. 
Differences are conditioned by positionality, access to information and the construction of 
‘economic imaginaries’ as well as material resources. By looking at these different expressions 
of SRS we highlight how they reinforce macro-scale socio-economic pressures, creating what 
we term ‘compound inequality’ into the future. Compound inequalities result from different 
behavioural responses to socio-economic conditions, inequality and (perceived or real) 
insecurity, which have the potential to exaggerate inequality and insecurity into the future.  







Social Reproduction Strategies: Understanding Compound Inequality in the 
Intergenerational Transfer of Capital, Assets and Resources  
 
 
 How can women understand their particular oppression in a way that can confront the 
narrowness of Marxist terminology (as used by the men in the movement) which focuses on 
work and economic relations as the primary (sometimes only) area of importance; and how 
can they develop a new theory which understands the importance of reproduction, family, 






This paper focuses on the way that households respond to ‘global pressures’ by adapting their 
social reproduction strategies (SRS). These pressures are transmitted through national and local 
scale institutions and felt on the micro-scale as increased inequality and (perceived) insecurity.  
We understand SRS to encapsulate the more or less consciously developed day-to-day and 
inter-generational responses to the social conditions that households confront and their own 
motivations and aspirations for the future. We extend here the notion of households, away from 
understanding these entities as passive recipients of contextual changes, to acknowledging the 
agency of households in making active choices, responding and indeed contributing to change 
(Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2018). Furthermore, we claim that understanding the ways 
that different households adapt their SRS is central to understanding the micro-foundations of 
larger scale and ever changing processes of social reproduction. 
  
Yet, due to a range of extant inequalities of accumulated and dynamic resources – some of 
which are material and some of which are at once ethereal and embodied in the concrete 
labouring capacities of individuals – we argue that SRS differ widely. Differences are 
conditioned by positionality, access to information and the construction of ‘economic 
imaginaries’ as well as the differentiated material capacity to respond to changing socio-
economic conditions. By looking at these different expressions of SRS we highlight how they 
reinforce macro-scale socio-economic pressures, creating what we term ‘compound inequality’ 
into the future. That is; different behavioural responses to socio-economic conditions, 
inequality and (perceived or real) insecurity exaggerate that inequality and insecurity into the 
future. 
 
Making these arguments, this paper contributes to three distinct but related literatures which 
exist on the edges of, and overlap with, the Marxist tradition. The first is the feminist political 
economy literature on social reproduction. We contribute a case study, connecting several 
scales to understand how SRS are adopted in the light of inequality and insecurity. The second 
relates to the policy concern with issues of inter-generational fairness and social mobility. The 
third is a sociological literature which draws heavily on Bourdieu to illustrate the role of the 
family in producing and transmitting ‘Capitals, Assets and Resources’ (CARs).  All these 
literatures provide useful insights into the ways that objective inequalities and subjective 
insecurities are internalised and experienced. When combined, these literatures provide 
accounts of the dynamics of contemporary capitalism and allow us to theorise the dialectical 
relations between structure and agency, and in particular the scalar-relations of production and 
reproduction.  Our first core contribution is that a focus on SRS, offers a rich insight into these 
dynamics and relations. 
 
This paper proceeds by outlining the mainstream literature on social mobility, before going on 
to identify weaknesses in this and the reasons we prefer to draw on materialist feminist 
understandings of social reproduction to more fully explore these issues. The paper then moves 
on to lay out a multi-scalar conceptualisation of social reproduction. This serves the purpose 




inequalities to generate ‘compound inequality’ and further provide a framework to structure 
future empirical research. The concept of compound inequality is our second key contribution. 
Inequality and Failing Social Mobility as a Social Reproduction Problem 
Widespread concern exists across the OECD (d’ Addio  2007; 2008; OECD 2018) about 
inequality and low levels of social fluidity; with some even stating that the fundamental 
promise of modern societies is broken, i.e. climbing up the social ladder through independent 
effort, regardless of social origin, has become impossible (Sachweh, Lenz, & Sthamer 2018). 
On closer investigation however, distinct but interrelated political concerns emerge. One 
concern is the popular perception that limited opportunities for upward mobility and declining 
life chances are creating political dissatisfaction: 
 
“... there is evidence suggesting that prospects of upward mobility also have a positive 
influence on life satisfaction and undermine individual self-esteem, social cohesion and 
people’s feeling that their voice counts, particularly among middle- and lower-income 
people.  This reduces trust in the socio-political system with potential negative 
consequences on democratic participation. This also strengthens political extremism or 
populism.” (OECD 2018). 
 
A second concern reflects elite worries that intergenerational inequalities will reduce overall 
skills, productivity and growth levels, including through behavioural responses to inequality: 
 
“In the context of increased inequalities of income and opportunities, lack of upward 
mobility at the bottom of the income distribution means that many potential talents are 
missed out or remain under-developed. It also means that many investment 
opportunities go unexploited and potential businesses never see the light. This 
undermines productivity and economic growth…” (OECD 2018: 13). 
 
These concerns have distinct manifestations in different national contexts; the one we are able 
to illustrate best is the UK. In that context, they have triggered policy responses over a long 
period of time that aimed at developing increased ‘fairness’: For example, in the latter years of 
the New Labour governments of the 2000s the findings of a series of high profile (though also 
contested: see Goldthorpe (2013)) studies (Blanden 2004; Blanden & Gregg 2007) were taken 
in the public debate to indicate declining opportunities for inter-generational mobility, and 
ultimately triggered the development of the Equality Act. When the Coalition Government 
came to power in 2010, it too placed a heavy emphasis on social mobility as ‘fairness’ (Nunn 
2012), and the subsequently created Social Mobility Commission shone a light on some 
institutional processes which act as barriers to mobility. However, there is ongoing 
consternation about a lack of progress in dealing with these issues (Social Mobility 
Commission 2017) and the head of the Commission resigned in 2017 in protest at a lack of 





“In America for 30 years real average earnings have remained flat. Now here the 
chancellor is predicting that will last for 20 years. That has a consequence for people, 
but a political consequence as well. It means more anger, more resentment and creates 
a breeding ground for populism” (Austin 2017). 
 
This echoes the types of concerns that came to the fore, especially in the wake of the Brexit 
referendum result but which are also visible in Theresa May’s promise when she first came to 
office to stand up for ‘just about managing families’ (May 2016). 
 
The wider social science literature provides a range of explanations for failing social mobility. 
From the 1950s onwards, comparative sociological research on social stratification and rational 
action differentiated between changes in the shape of class structures and changes in the relative 
chances of moving within them. Put simply, this research showed that urbanisation, 
industrialisation and the growth of the state and service sectors generated increases in what are 
measured in Weberian terms as ‘middle class’1 jobs across the post-war period in Europe and 
North America (where state administrative structures were sufficient to generate good quality 
data). This changing occupational structure could be said to be changing the class structure of 
society. Yet, at the same time, this research also showed that the relative opportunities for 
mobility within the structure were less obvious. Some research showed slight increases in 
social fluidity and other research showed a trendless fluctuation. Here, Erikson and 
Goldthorpe’s (1992) The Constant Flux, represented the culmination of several decades of 
international collaborative empirical work (Sorensen 1992).  Toward the end of this volume 
they conclude that the cause of the persistence of inequality between generations exists “chiefly 
at the micro level of adaptive individual and family strategies...” and that research should 
therefore “move down from the level of macro-sociological relationships to … the social 
processes that are involved in class mobility or immobility: namely, how middle-class 
individuals draw on and apply family resources across generations in the reproduction of 
advantage” (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 397; as quoted in Savage et al 2005).  Moving on to 
seek explanations at this scale, Goldthorpe and other collaborators (e.g. Breen & Goldthorpe 
1997) focussed on working class choices to leave school early or to make vocational choices 
were entirely rational, even if they constrained future opportunities because of immediate cost 
and benefit calculations and the time horizons over which these calculations could be made.  
As such, a large part of what explained persistence in inter-generational opportunities was not 
institutional closure per se but the ways in which pre-existing resources shape decision-making 
differentially.  Put simply; pre-existing structural inequalities affect agency in such a way as to 
reproduce inequalities into the future. It is this idea that we develop below and term ‘compound 
inequality’. 
 
                                               
1 Throughout this article we draw on the sociological language of ‘working class’ and ‘middle class’ but we 
treat these as sections of an objective ‘working class’ in the Marxist sense.  That said, as the discussion will 
make clear, we think that these materially and subjectively hierarchically organised factions of the working class 
are significant in organising the dynamic social reproduction of inequality and are functional to the reproduction 




The mainstream alternative to the above ‘rational action approach’ to understanding the 
reproduction of socio-economic status, builds largely on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieuian understandings of the micro-processes which shape socio-economic reproduction 
are critical of rational action approaches for being theoretically simplistic, and even descriptive 
(Savage et al. 2005). Bourdieu argues that individuals compete with one another for status in a 
series of ‘fields’ in which different types of individualised ‘capital’ offer advantages.  Showing 
how social relationships and networks, on the one hand, and the role of tastes and dispositions, 
on the other, help to position individuals in a series of lifestyles which correspond to social 
space, Bourdieu opens up the idea that cultural and social capital offer advantages in granting 
access to particular types of social space, though advantages in one, may not transfer to another. 
The major contribution of this work is three fold: to illustrate subtle horizontal and vertical 
forms of social closure which operate in formal and informal social institutions; the 
significance of culture and networks for granting access to these for individuals; and the role 
of family and educational institutions in generating social and cultural capital.  Often relatively 
marginal differences (preference and comfort with cultural signifiers or linguistic codes), might 
grant access to particular social status positions without this being necessarily functional to 
capital, at least understood in the Marxist sense as being directly productive of surplus value. 
Bourdieu concludes that these powerful mechanisms act consistently to give a particular 
understanding of ‘Social Reproduction’ as stasis: the simple reproduction of the status quo 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1990: 28f.) 
 
Bourdieu's key concepts of habitus and individualised capitals in the micro-processes of 
reproduction have been widely taken up in operational research on the reproduction of 
inequalities and perhaps now provide the dominant explanation for a lack of social mobility 
(Schiek and Ulrich 2018: 88). One of the most celebrated examples of this application is in the 
work of Annette Lareau. Her carefully elaborated and exhaustive ethnographic research with 
12 families and a wider sample of 88 school children in two US communities was ultimately 
published in Unequal Childhoods (Lareau 2011). The major conclusion from Lareau’s study is 
that parenting strategies are hugely important in transmitting Bourdieu’s ‘capitals’ to children.  
She found that middle class parenting revolved around concerted cultivation (Lareau 2002) in 
which a cult of individualism is generated by a focussed labouring process devoted to the 
development of a particular form of behaviour, language and reasoning, often aided by 
numerous organised activities outside of the home.  By contrast, among working class and poor 
families an alternative parenting strategy of natural growth predominated in which children 
are left to their own devices within a stricter application of disciplinary and ethical codes.  She 
suggests that these parenting strategies encourage divergent dispositions in children toward 
professionals and institutions. According to Lareau, children subjected to concerted cultivation 
develop a sense of ‘entitlement’ which encourages them to question and intervene to gain 
support external to the family, in a way that contrasts with the more ‘constrained’ approach of 
children and parents from working-class backgrounds. Future inequalities are (re)produced 
through effects of material resources and (class) behavioural differences in parenting.  
 
We suggest that this distinction has much to offer but is becoming outdated.  We suggest that 




materially and qualitatively from some middle class families.  Both these types might be 
thought of as aspirational for a position in the post-war ‘New Middle Class’ (NMC), even if 
they were able to manipulate differential resources to realise this.  However, as the growth of 
the NMC has slowed, a third group who are either unable or unwilling even to aspire to a 
position within it has become increasingly prominent. The state’s orientation toward this group 
has also become increasingly disciplinary and authoritarian as it has sought to impose 
aspiration upon it (Nunn & Tepe-Belfrage 2017). Furthermore, research on what we will call 
the ‘poverty class faction’ suggests other factors of relevance to explain the (absence of) social 
mobility for people in poverty than for those aspiring NMCs. In contrast to these ‘working’ 
and ‘middle class’ parenting strategies and their role in enabling or undermining social 
mobility, wider research on poverty still defines parental structures (‘single motherhood’, 
‘absent father’) and or the number of children in a family (child poverty) as the dominant reason 
for poverty and for a lack of mobility out of poverty. This is the case ‘even though it is foremost 
individual qualifications, chosen educational tracks and related qualifications that provide 
socio-economic security for biographies in the working society’ (Schiek and Ulrich 2018: 89, 
translation by authors).   
 
These poorer and more closely surveilled families are even more dependent on supportive state 
services (e.g. child care, education, health, family and social work support) in their SRS.  They 
are also more subject to disciplinary services to correct their behaviours (including parenting 
behaviours) which at the extreme involve the state assuming responsibility for parenting in 
institutional or foster care settings.  Care data shows that the numbers of children in state care 
has increased markedly over recent years, possibly due to increased austerity-influenced 
poverty and reduced supportive services.  Given this, it is notable that there is no national 
record of the class or educational position of foster-families themselves, and children and 
young people with care experiences have often had to cope with multiple disruptions in 
supportive ‘parental relationships’ once in the care of the state. They still tend to do much 
worse in terms of educational attainment and long-term social outcomes (criminality, physical 
and mental health and life expectancy).  The cruel irony then is that state action to replace 
parental influences in these cases does not for many lead to replacing poverty-class faction 
parenting with the ideal-type middle class experience.2 
 
Thus, taken together, mainstream explanations for social (im)mobility provide useful insights 
into the micro-processes underpinning social reproduction, and in particular the interaction of 
structure and agency.  There is widespread support from research (Carolan & Wasserman 2015; 
Chin & Phillips 2004; Jaeger 2007; Jaeger & Breen 2016; Jæger & Møllegaard 2017; Martin 
2012; Roksa & Potter 2011)3 in a range of national contexts that the acquisition and transfer of 
social and cultural capital from parents to children is significant in shaping life chances, 
                                               
2 As Berridge (Berridge 2017) has often noted, this is not to say that state care creates these outcomes, but it 
certainly does not do enough to mitigate them. 
3 We should also note here the recent contribution of Savage et al.’s (2013; 2014) major survey of class 
positions in the UK, which they used to propose alternative theories of class positions and reproduction.  We do 
not dwell on it in the narrative because of the widely noted shortcomings in the outcomes of this (e.g. see 




including as these are mediated via the education system. One theme that emerges from 
research in the UK (Vincent & Ball 2007) and the US (Cooper 2014) is that agency may be 
particularly affected by structural conditions of increased insecurity.  It seems middle class 
families may be even more determined in their efforts at concerted cultivation, precisely when 
insecurities increase their fear of children losing status between generations (Irwin & Elley 
2011).  Rollock (2014) argues that race intersects with class here in such a way that black 
middle class families have to work harder at displaying and utilising their middle class social 
and cultural capital in order to access middle class advantaged networks and social spaces.  
International comparative research also suggests that parental efforts are less strenuous when 
there is ‘less distance to fall’ (Nunn 2013).   
 
However, there are also several important shortcomings in this literature. Conceptually, 
understandings of the ways in which individual ‘capitals’ relate to institutional settings only 
take us part of the way to an explanation for the changing class structure and access to positions 
within it.  Without being incorporated within a wider theory of capitalism they ultimately fail 
to explain how relations of domination and inequality result from the interaction of agency with 
structure with definite political economy characteristics  (Burawoy 2012; 2018). It is significant 
of course that micro-processes and relations between households, families and institutions 
produce relative advantage for some and disadvantage for others, but without exploring the 
structural processes that determine the ends which stratification serves – in terms of a 
hierarchically organised labour force for example, we lack an understanding of the role and 
significance of the very inequalities they reproduce. Moreover, while there is widespread 
operationalisation of Bourdieu’s idea of ‘capitals’; evidence of precisely how and why 
households acquire, accumulate, transfer and exploit these resources and especially gendered 
trade-offs involved between household members are less clearly illuminated (Bradley 2014; 
Goldthorpe 2007; Jaeger & Breen 2016; Savage et al 2013; Mills 2014).  A further interesting 
corollary of this is that the above research tends to emphasise continuity in the social structure 
- literally reproduction - as opposed to highlighting the ways that social reproduction is always 
at the same time a dynamic process of social transformation dialectically linked to inter-
capitalist competition and crisis tendencies, state-institutional strategies and formations and 
technological development. In order to address these shortcomings, we argue for the 
application of a scalar-relational understanding of social reproduction to understand the 
interpolation between macro-scale changes associated with the world-wide expanded 
reproduction of capital and the micro-scale processes of household social reproduction. 
Scale, Social Reproduction and Household Social Reproduction Strategies 
Marx’s understanding of processes of reproduction is inherently multi-scalar; he details the 
operation of a series of circuits through which value circulates and whose relations to one 
another comprise the reproduction of capital as a social system, through smaller scale processes 
(Marx 1956). At its most basic, workers are reproduced through the subsistence wage, 
determined by the costs of reproduction and capital is reproduced through the realisation of 
surplus value in the money form.  For Marx, reproduction is not a simplistic static process but 




struggle (including the struggle for daily reproduction of labour power) mean that capital must 
constantly search for a greater volume of inputs of labour in order to valorise the expanded 
money stock.  Crises are frequent and occur at different degrees of severity for the system as a 
whole, but frequently create further expansionary pressures, including through ‘spatial fixes’ 
(Harvey 1982).  
 
Underpinning this system though is the reproduction of labour power with particular 
characteristics and whose reproduction can only be partly attributed to the internal relations of 
capital.  While the wage certainly accounts for some of the reproductive process, it rarely, if 
ever, accounts for its entirety. Rather, free inputs of time, care work and norm-creation are 
required to underpin capitalist social relations (Elson 1998; Fraser 2014; Steans & Tepe 2010; 
Bakker 2007). Feminists have repeatedly shown that the identity of those undertaking this 
unpaid and undervalued work reveals additional relations of domination and inequality related 
to patriarchy and racism, outside of the class relation, yet functionally internal to the 
reproduction of capital (Federici 2005; Mies 2014). To understand contemporary questions 
about the future of work, the reproduction of inequalities, decreasing social fluidity or the role 
of anxiety about inter-generational opportunities in driving political polarisation, it is necessary 
to locate them within the inter-relation of the different scales and circuits of production and 
reproduction. These circuits and systems of reproduction - of capital, of people and labour 
power, of communities, of ideology and norms - require distinct explanation and theorisation; 
but also the dialectical and co-evolutionary interlinkages between them ought to be the focus 
of theorisation and empirical research.  It is here that a scalar-relational approach is of value. 
 
We have already shown that post-war restructuring provided the context for upward absolute 
mobility in Europe and North America, as the ‘New Middle Class’ expanded relative to the 
traditional working class. As ‘globalisation’ led to integrated internationalised production and 
service commodity chains, this process slowed, and in some places possibly stopped (see Nunn 
& Tepe-Belfrage 2017). To make sense of such change it is necessary to locate the national 
economy in the wider scale of world market expansion which pressures individual states (and 
macro regions such as the EU) to pursue greater competitiveness. While, for a time world 
market expansion could facilitate legitimacy in many EU and North American states by 
mitigating the effects of declining growth in high status positions, through supporting the 
expansion of credit and providing cheap consumer goods (Harvey 2010; Chapter 1); the period 
since the late 1970s has become marked by increased inequality (Piketty 2014). Moreover, 
since the 2008 crisis, the limits of debt-fuelled consumerism have become increasingly 
transparent as a means of offsetting that inequality. In turn this has sharpened concerns about 
political legitimacy and the risk of collapsing consensus Nunn 2015).   
 
Of course, the dynamics of world market integration and the attendant pressures that this 
creates on lower scale political communities and institutions to adapt to the systemic 
characteristic of competition do not just arise but are ‘produced’ (Burnham 2001) in definite 
social processes generating dynamic patterns of uneven development. Here, the political scalar 
pressures to compete arise from the desire to use political authority to attract and capture flows 




taxation revenues (Burnham 1991; 2001; Clarke 1983). In helping capital to confront the 
embedded social interests of the post-war consensus, states have removed and restructured 
employment protections, shifted the orientation of state policy away from welfare provision 
toward pro-competitiveness, privatisation and so called ‘enabling’ forms of social and 
industrial policy,4 enforcing new inequalities of class, gender and race (Grover 2012; Nunn 
and Tepe-Belfrage 2017; Nunn 2016). 
 
At the macro-scale the empirical observations about the changing absolute shape of inequalities 
are the product of the ‘ecological dominance’ (Jessop 2012: 207–210) of the scale of the world 
market over other scales. As world market integration proceeds, it creates feedback effects that 
disrupt domestic social structures (Jessop 2015). In a system where lower scale actors attempt 
to cope with system scale characteristics by competing, it is inevitable that success will be 
highly varied and some will fail (Peck & Theodore 2001: 432).  Whatever scale below the 
world market we might take, failure at one point in time is likely to have negative implications 
for the capacity to compete in the future. Differential success and failure obviously effects 
small scales, including households, families and individuals as part of aggregate absolute 
successes and as failures at broader scales (e.g. Cities, regions, states), and relative success and 
failure within them (for specific communities and households) (Nunn 2019). Where households 
succeed at adapting to competitive pressures at higher-scales they may gain resources that are 
useful in facilitating future success.  Where they fail, the inverse is clearly true, impeding their 
ability to cope with competitive pressures on a day to day and inter-generational basis 
(Hargreaves, Hodgson, Noor-Mohamed, & Nunn 2018; Nunn 2016). 
 
But these lower scale actors and institutions also act in ways that either reshape or consciously 
challenge higher scale structural pressures (Peck 2002).  As Bakker notes, quoting Braudel, 
these everyday low-level practices can have cumulative system-level implications: ‘The 
everyday happening is repeated and the more often it is repeated the more likely it is to become 
a generality or rather a structure … some structures, because of their long life become stable 
elements for an infinite number of generations’ (Braudel, quoted in Bakker (2007: 542). 
 
Bakker’s focus here is on the interaction between long-term and durable structures and the 
everyday rhythms that make up daily life.  She particularly poses questions about the ways in 
which social reproduction processes embed the character of the world wide system of capitalist 
production (including the processes of dispossession that exist alongside and in dialectical 
relation to, but formally outside of capitalist social relations (Bonefeld 2011; Glassman 2006; 
Harvey 2003; Mies 2014) and all its constituent features in everyday life. These include micro-
processes such as household behaviour and the ways in which households relate to “subsistence 
and locality on the one hand, and production and commerce, indeed the mobility and power of 
capital on the other” (Bakker 2007: 544).  These micro-processes are ‘related to how people 
manage their work and daily lives, especially in the context of a growing climate of inequality 
in the distribution of resource between households at the local, national and transnational 
                                               
4 As even the OECD - one of the chief cheerleaders for such reforms - now acknowledges (Bassanini 




levels...the production of home spaces, (the tasks of the day-to-day such as child care and food 
security), environmental degradation and its unequal spatial toll on childrens’ bodies, and the 
relationships between society, the state (policies and practices) and space…”  (551).  
 
To date, the concept of social reproduction in feminist political economy has mainly been 
employed to theoretically capture the changing interlinkages between care, work and the social 
economy under neoliberalism and accompanying financialisation (Bakker 2003; Katz 2001; 
Bakker and Silvey 2008; LeBaron and Roberts 2010). A particular theme has been to highlight 
the ways that state roll-back under neo-liberalisation and post GFC austerity has placed greater 
stress on the household, and in particular women, to act as ‘shock absorbers for the formal 
economy, as they continue to provide unpaid reproductive labour but with less support from 
state services. Some observers have highlighted the ways that this ‘depletes’ (Rai, Hoskyns, & 
Thomas 2014) household resources.  This line of argument has attracted some criticism 
however. Kunz (2010) argues that ‘privatising social reproduction’ is a particular experience 
present only in those parts of the world system where welfare states temporarily provided the 
historically exceptional experience of state support for social reproduction; an experience not 
shared therefore by the vast majority of the world.   
 
While recognising both the initial argument and Kunz’s challenge, we want to offer further 
nuance to the discussion. The extent to which social reproduction is privatised in any particular 
context, is a largely contingent feature. In fact, in the realm of reproducing labour power across 
generations it is difficult to think of the state withdrawing from socially reproductive activity. 
In many respects the state in recent years is more active, has greater capacity and is more 
controlling in the way that it shapes intergenerational reproduction. For instance, in the UK 
context, children enter the care of the state for educational purposes younger than they have 
ever done previously, the hours of this care are longer, investment in and sophistication of the 
training of teachers is greater than ever before, children stay in the system longer and must 
formally pass particular qualifications before they can progress to further levels of education 
in a way that has never been the case previously.  It is also the case that the way that these 
systems operate is more domineering of household processes of parenting than ever before, due 
to the governance technologies deployed.  A heavy emphasis on auditing, surveillance and 
performance management means that schools are compelled to engage parents in supporting 
the education process to a much greater extent than previously. The school curriculum is more 
centrally regulated by the state than at any previous time. Parents are frequently ‘taught to 
teach’ to the tests that the state dictates, to encourage their children to aspire to an ideal of 
‘middle class’ social status and to take concrete steps to help realise this. Furthermore, the 
surveillance element of institutional oversight is particularly present in the lives of poor 
families, where disciplinary projects to regulate parenting require schools to monitor the lives 
of children from poor families ever more closely and intervene where they are judged as not 
supportive of state objectives of aspiration and behaviour likely to realise this. 
 
Utilising a ‘deficit model’ and under the (conscious or unconscious) influence of Bourdieuian 




Partnerships’5 often try to provide access to cultural and social capital to correct for what they 
perceive as the absence of any such capitals in some households.  For example, it has become 
widespread for local chambers of commerce to encourage business interaction with schools 
and around 40% (and increasing) schools will now have frequent employer visits, designed to 
raise aspirations and schools are measured against 8 ‘Gatsby Benchmarks’ designed to promote 
stronger careers guidance and support across schools (Careers and Enterprise Company 2018). 
Other interventions try to disseminate experiences of high culture to particular groups of 
children to mimic ‘typical’ middle class cultural capital transfer.  Added to this, at the extremes, 
parents who fail to engage are more likely than ever before to have their children removed from 
them (Department for Education 2017a; 2017b) and placed in the full and formal care of the 
state, with educational attainment being an increasing focus of this formal care system 
(Berridge 2017; Jackson 1998). In sum, far from withdrawing from supporting social 
reproduction, the state has expanded, deepened and tightened its control of reproducing the 
future workforce under conditions of increased global competition. 
 
However, several further general points are important here. First, this is a highly uneven 
process. Not all households are subject to the same level of state intervention.  The state is 
much more interventionist with those households it deems as less willing or able to play a full 
part in striving to access higher social status (Nunn & Tepe-Belfrage 2017) and at the other 
end of the spectrum more affluent households can literally buy themselves partially out of state 
interference through, for example, independent school fees.  Second, while state action to 
organise social reproduction places additional burdens on households to engage in the process; 
it is still depleting of household resources.  
 
Third, what has widely been understood as a crisis of social reproduction (Martin 2010) needs 
also to be understood in a scalar way.  At the scale of the national economy and society and 
many communities, this may in fact be a form of adjustment in SRS rather than a moment of 
crisis. This is not to suggest that the adjustment of SRS is not a violent process, causing physical 
and emotional harm.  Yet, the term crisis indicates a moment of calamity where a turning point 
is reached (Gill 2012: 27). We suggest the opposite. SRS adapt to, and even increase, inequality 
(see section below) without indicating a necessity for wider change. At the micro-scale, some 
households will certainly experience this as a crisis, but the majority continue to ‘cope’ with 
the effects of depletion, harm and ongoing struggle, and at more macro-scales communities 
and workforces continue to be reproduced in a way that is suitable to capital.  Indeed, the need 
for an expanded state role in this is driven by crisis, understood in the sense of the failure of 
social reproduction to meet the dynamically changing demands of capital, leading to 
geographical switching crises (Harvey 2010: 93) for particular communities.  So like the idea 
that social reproduction is being privatised, we treat the idea of crisis as an essentially 
contingent idea which must again be understood in a scalar-relational form.  Crisis pressures 
(which may remain latent or become material) may manifest at some scales but not others and 
the aggregate effects of smaller scale crises may manifest at larger scales.  Exploring crises in 
                                               




social reproduction is essentially a matter of utilising the theoretical framework for empirical 
investigation.   
 
Finally, the role of the state in trying to manage social reproduction directly, and via its 
influence on households, is discharged through “the materialized daily practices of agents who 
are part of the state apparatus” (Mitchell, Marston, & Katz 2003).  This necessitates 
understanding the performance of state power through “human practice and cultural logics”.  
The state may operate with a functional logic related to its desire to attract and retain capital, 
to pursue national competitiveness and manage crisis pressures at the national scale.  It may 
sometimes do this by downloading social risk - and therefore the potential for and experience 
of crisis - to lower scales. However, it must pursue these objectives through people, whose 
subjectivities are only partially shaped by the demands and logic of capital. As such, at the 
scale of frontline practice - the street level bureaucrats (Brodkin 2013; Lipsky 1980) and service 
workers may actively, unconsciously or inadvertently subvert (Barnes & Prior 2009; Dobson 
2015) or partially renegotiate objectives as they also seek to ‘cope’ creatively with the 
challenges they face. In conditions of neo-liberalisation, welfare retrenchment and expanded 
state intervention in social reproduction, these frontline workers are often trapped between the 
social needs of their service users; formal policy routines and budgets; and the reality of 
competition at lower scales.  As they seek to do this, they may not always actively or effectively 
pursue reproduction as envisaged by policy makers or demanded by capital (Hargreaves et al. 
2018).  As a result, like crisis and privatisation, state activities in relation to organising social 
reproduction must always be treated as at least a partially contingent and empirical question, 
rather than as theoretically pre-determined.  A scalar-relational understanding of policy 
implementation is also important since national policy makers do not always get what they 
want from lower-scale ‘policy work’. 
Structure and Household Agency: from Social Reproduction Strategies to Compound 
Inequality 
Lucas (2001) argues that learner considerations in educational decision making may reflect a 
strategy of “Effectively Maintained Inequality’, where higher status households respond to 
changes in average levels of education by either extending their educational engagement, or 
adjusting in some more nuanced way to accentuate advantages associated with for example, 
educational institution or the choice of subjects studied. The literature on UK educational 
investment notes this as a crucial explanation for observed reductions in social fluidity 
(Blanden & Macmillan 2016). Looking at evidence from the US we suggest that these 
household SRS may be adjusting to perceived inequalities and uncertainties in ways that 
generate increased inequality into the future. That is, the relation between insecurities arising 
from increased competitiveness at the world market scale on the one hand, and household scale 
agency in conscious and unconsciously developed SRS on the other, may be generating what 
might be termed ‘Compound Inequalities’.   
 
In a recent contribution, Schneider et al. (2018) show that US households may be responding 




investing more in their children in response to inequalities, over and above the mechanical 
effects of having more financial resources to draw on.  They conclude that in the context of 
increased inequalities households with the capacity to do so are strengthening the extent to 
which they engage in ‘concerted cultivation’. Similarly, based on in-depth research with 
households in the US, especially women, Cooper (2014) argues that more affluent families are 
particularly sensitive to contemporary insecurities and display disproportionate anxiety about 
the future prospects of their children, compared with less affluent households.  Other research 
argues that in response to these insecurities more affluent households are becoming more active 
in hoarding opportunities (Reeves 2018) or negotiating with services  (McCrory Calarco 2018) 
to lever advantage. 
 
There is also some tentative aggregate evidence that similar dynamics in household strategies 
might be relevant to the UK case.  For example, research (Nunn 2016) shows that households 
have already adjusted to economic insecurities in ways that are shaped by pre-existing 
inequalities.  This is visible for instance in the housing market where inequalities are often 
increasingly present in relations of accumulation and disaccumulation between households as 
mediated via housing and credit markets rather than just the labour market.  On the one hand, 
an increasing proportion of outstanding mortgage debt is related to buy-to-let housing as 
wealthier households use asset-based strategies to safeguard their future wellbeing. On the 
other hand, home ownership has fallen dramatically, especially for younger generations, 
corresponding to an increase in private renting.  Given that private rents are on average 40% 
of household income, while mortgage costs are on average 20% of household income, this 
relates to a direct subsidy by less affluent households of the longer-term welfare strategies of 
more affluent households (Nunn 2016). This has a cumulative longer-term impact associated 
with inheritance also. Thus, more affluent households are driven by insecurities toward SRS 
that accentuate inequalities (Montgomerie 2006; 2009; Seabrooke 2010). 
 
At the same time, behavioural responses to inequality and insecurity may also drive inequalities 
at the other end of the distribution. Poorer households are driven to adopt SRS which accentuate 
short-term social status with negative longer-term outcomes.  For example, Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2018) show that status anxiety may drive (debt funded) conspicuous consumption to 
demonstrate status now. This is one possible explanation for the burgeoning role of new credit 
products for car purchases in the UK context, which are acknowledged as a status product but 
it also potentially undermines the capacity of resource constrained households to invest in 
longer-term welfare and reproduction strategies. 
Conclusion 
The argument developed in this paper suggests that political economy understandings of social 
reproduction can learn from some of the outcomes from micro-processes as identified in 
empirical research operationalising Bourdieuian and rational action concepts, which have 
become the primary means of exploring the micro-processes of reproduction in the mainstream 
social science literature.  However, we also identify substantial problems in this literature and 




these. In particular, social reproduction theory can help to overcome a failure to fully appreciate 
the multi-scalar and scalar-relational aspects of social reproduction. Most significantly of all, 
by building on Marx’s understanding of the reproduction of capital, feminist social 
reproduction theory helps to theorise capitalism as a social totality and the relations between 
distinct but inter-related circuits involved in the dynamic reproduction of that totality.  It is one 
thing to assert that inequalities are reproduced over time and between generations, but it is 
necessary also to think about how changing patterns within that reproduction are related to the 
reproduction of capital as a social relation. 
 
We seek to advance this understanding in the context of one aspect of the contemporary 
reproduction of capitalist social relations and propose two novel contributions; the concepts of 
household Social Reproduction Strategies and the related contingent outcome arising from 
these; Compound Inequality. These are significant because they demonstrate the relation 
between micro-scales and macro-structures, as existing inequalities generate micro-
behavioural responses at the scale of the household which themselves contribute to the 
accumulation of social structure, in the ways that Bakker’s understanding of scale and social 
reproduction suggests. 
 
However, we also suggest two further empirical contributions to knowledge.  Our particular 
empirical frame of reference - the household SRS of less and more affluent households in the 
UK in the contemporary conjuncture - suggests that the frequently cited dynamics of 
‘privatising social reproduction’ as it usually appears in the social reproduction literature 
requires some nuanced interpretation.  In the case of state interaction with household SRS the 
evidence suggests that the state exhibits an expansionary remit rather than retrenchment.   This 
is the case in relation to its direct intervention to drive aspiration, career planning and 
educational decision-making affecting households differentially according to their socio-
economic status.  It is also the case in its indirect work which is often steered through 
engagement with households, as it seeks to ensure that parenting behaviour raises aspiration 
and activity designed to reproduce effective labour power, dynamically adjusting these efforts 
to meet the changing demands of capital and UK state strategies to capture value in the global 
economy.  
 
The second empirical contribution relates to our understanding of another prominent theme in 
the social reproduction literature - the idea that because of state withdrawal and enhanced 
economic compunction there is some form of crisis in social reproduction.  We agree that 
household resources for SRS are depleted by these dynamics. Indeed, even where the state is 
not in withdrawal this might also place households under more stress, to live up to the demands 
placed upon them.  However, the deployment of the idea of crisis needs to be carefully 
understood in scalar-relational terms also.  It is indeed true that this may generate crises inside 
some households.  We recognise fully that the duress that households are under generates 
substantial harm, household collapse, suffering and even death.  However, at a more aggregate 
scale, households continue to support the reproduction of capital, labour and communities that 
underpin the formal circulation of value.  Social reproduction does not need to be nice to 





This picture suggests that detailed empirical research is necessary to better understand the 
contemporary processes by which multi-scalar social reproduction occurs. Our analysis 
suggests that alongside macro-scale investigations into the nature of the expanding world scale 
of capitalist social relations, it is necessary to enquire also into local scale processes of 
adaptation to, and remaking of, these pressures.  This involves understanding how global 
pressures create particular formations of economic production in specific local economies, and 
how these are related to smaller scale institutional strategies and household SRS.  Such a scalar-
relational approach is particularly relevant, we argue, at a time when socio-economic and 
technological change are so rapid that problematics such as ‘the future of work’ become a 
matter of considerable uncertainty and insecurity. At such times, the ways that households 
understand and respond to the pressures they face will shape their successes and failures into 
the future.  As such, we suggest that detailed empirical research in different socio-economic 
and political settings and related to household SRS is a matter of considerable contemporary 
importance.  The discussion above suggests some fruitful methodological pathways through 
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